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Convenience and Necessity in the Inconsistent
Legal Treatments of Indian Status
Sterling Paulson*
I N T R O D U C T IO N
A. The Cherokee Freedmen Experience
The Cherokee, Creek, Seminole, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Nations were
historically referred to by the U.S. Government as the “Five Civilized Tribes of
Indian Territory.”1 Recognition as a “civilized” people was largely based on
these tribes’ proficiency in adopting and “[practicing] the white man’s ways and
[having] their customs.”2 Some of the important touchstones of perceived
civilization included centralized governments, formal education, conversion to
Christianity, adoption of the white man’s vesture, individual land ownership,
and agricultural and industrial production.3 Industry among the tribes
occurred subsequent to adoption of the white man’s pattern of individual land
holdings. The advancement of these civilized tribes, in the eyes of the U.S.
Government, was also driven by the “great aid” of “negro slave labor, and since
the [Civil War] the freedmen.”4 Of the Five Civilized Tribes, the Cherokees

* J.D., The University of Chicago Law School, 2018. Many thanks to the IJLSE staff for their
diligence and thoughtful feedback. Any correspondence can be sent to sterlingpaulson@yahoo.com.
1 Thomas Donaldson, U.S. Dep’t. of Interior, Eighth Census of the United States: Indians. The Five
Civilized Tribes of Indian Territory, Cherokee Nation, Creek Nation, Seminole Nation, Choctaw
Nation, and Chickasaw Nation (1893).
2 Id. at 38.
3 See id.
4 Id. The transatlantic slave trade and European practice of African slavery introduced “negro slave
labor” to Indian tribes. The African slave trade was implemented only after indigenous Indian slave
labor was found to be insufficient for the needs of European colonists. The commercial aspect and sheer
scale of this form of slavery was novel to North America. However, “[s]lavery was not new to North
Americans Indians at contact and most native groups practiced an indigenous form of slavery” in
which slaves were taken by victorious tribes as spoils of war, or otherwise as direct objectives of
military action—i.e., for the very purpose of obtaining slaves. THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN
INDIAN HISTORY 47 (Frederick E. Hoxie ed., 2016). Various tribes also included enslavement as a
punishment for certain crimes committed by their own tribal members. The role of slaves differed
between and within tribes. Some slaves were put to the work of forced labor. Others were adopted into
the tribe, to replace fallen warriors or otherwise increase population. Still others were used as
sacrifices for religious ceremonies, or became concubines of tribal members. See generally CHRISTINA
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held the largest number of said “negro slaves,” possessing 4,600 slaves by the
time of the American Civil War.5 In one of the lost sagas of American history,
the Cherokee militia, under the direction of the Cherokee National Council,
hunted down a group of thirty-five such escaped, Cherokee-owned “negro
slaves” headed for the Mexico border in 1842. As a result of this failed escape
from bondage, five of the escapees were sentenced to death.6 The escape of the
slaves was blamed on the influence of free blacks living in and around the
Cherokee Nation and led to a December 1842 Cherokee law that commanded
all free blacks to leave the lands of the Cherokee Nation.7
During the early months of the American Civil War, various Cherokee
contingencies sided with either the Union or Confederate Armies.8 The
Cherokee Nation itself initially remained neutral. However, after early
Cherokee-aided Confederate victories, including the Battle of Bull Run, the
Cherokee Nation issued its Cherokee Declaration of Causes on October 28,
1861.9 This declaration announced the Cherokee decision to unite fortunes
with the Confederacy, like the other Five Civilized Tribes, and to declare war
on the United States.10 When the Principal Chief, John Ross, turned tide and
expressed support for the Union, he was forced into exile by Cherokee
Confederates. However, a group of his loyal supporters called an emergency
session of the Cherokee National Council in 1863, at which they removed
Confederates from office, revoked their treaty with the South, pledged loyalty
to the Union and the United States, and officially emancipated their African

SNYDER, SLAVERY IN INDIAN COUNTRY: THE CHANGING FACE OF CAPTIVITY IN EARLY AMERICA (2010). For a
less-than-authoritative overview of the topic, see also Tony Seybert, Slavery and Native Americans in
British North American: 1600 to 1865
https://web.archive.org/web/20040804001522/http://www.slaveryinamerica.org/history/hs_es_indians_sl
avery.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2018).
5 See Art T. Burton, OKLAHOMA HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Slave Revolt of 1842,
http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=SL002 (last visited Sept. 7 2018); see also
Daniel F. Little Field Jr. & Lonnie E. Underhill, Slave “Revolt” in the Cherokee Nation, 1842,
AMERICAN INDIAN QUARTERLY NO. 2 (Summer 1977) 121–31.
6 Burton, supra note 5.
7 Id.
8 See The Cherokee and the Civil War, http://www.cherokee.org/About-The-Nation/History/Facts/TheCherokee-and-the-Civil-War (last visited Sept. 6, 2018). For a more in-depth treatment, see Clarissa
W. Confer, THE CHEROKEE NATION AND THE CIVIL WAR (2007).
9 Cherokee Declarations of Causes (Oct. 28, 1861), http://www.cherokee.org/About-TheNation/History/Events/Cherokee-Declaration-of-Causes-October-28-1861.
10 Id.
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slaves.11 Nonetheless, Confederate Brigadier General Stand Watie, a
Cherokee, and his command of combined Cherokee and non-Cherokee soldiers
persisted in their fight against the Union. Brigadier General Watie was in fact
the last Confederate General to surrender to the Union.12 In 1866, the
Cherokee Nation entered into a post-war treaty with the U.S. Government, by
which they agreed to legally define former slaves as tribal citizens. 13 The
Treaty of 1866 provided that:
All freedmen who have been liberated by voluntary act of
their former owners or by law, as well as all free colored
persons who were in the country at the commencement of
the rebellion, and are now residents therein, or who may
return within six months, and their descendants shall
have the rights of native Cherokees.14
The Cherokee Constitution was then amended to read:
All Native Born Cherokees, all Indians and Whites Legally
Members of the Nation by Adoption, and all Freedmen who
have been liberated by Voluntary Act of their Former
Owners or by Law, as well as Free Colored Persons who
were in the Country at the Commencement of the
Rebellion, and are now Residents therein … and their
Descendants who Reside within the Limits of the Cherokee
Nation, shall be taken, and deemed to be, Citizens of the
Cherokee Nation.15
The freed slaves, termed “Cherokee Freedmen,” were long thereafter
considered members of the Cherokee Nation, even if not considered “Cherokee,”
and their labor continued to drive the agriculture of the Cherokee.16 Even as

See The Cherokee and the Civil War, supra note 8. This may have largely been an act of selfsurvival, as it occurred after a series of Confederate losses and amidst a sweeping Union invasion of
the Indian Territory.
12 See id.
13 See S. Alan Ray, A Race or a Nation? Cherokee National Identity and the Status of Freedmen’s
Descendants, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 387, 404 (2007).
14 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 944 (1904),
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/Vol2/treaties/che0942.htm.
15 CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 5 (amended 1866 version) (emphasis added).
16 See DONALDSON, supra note 1, at 38, 41. Freedmen were similarly recognized as vital cogs of the
economies of the other Civilized Tribes after the American Civil War.
11
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amended in 1975, Article III of the Cherokee Constitution left open tribal
membership to these Freedmen:
All members of the Cherokee Nation must be citizens as proven
by reference to the Dawes Commission Rolls, including the
Delaware Cherokees of Article II of the Delaware Agreement
dated the 8th day of May, 1867, and the Shawnee Cherokees
as of Article III of the Shawnee Agreement dated the 9th day
of June, 1869, and/or their descendants.17
The Dawes Commission Rolls included as citizens not only those who
were “Cherokee by Blood,” but also “Cherokee Freedmen,” “Delaware
Cherokee,” and “Intermarried Whites.”18 The Delaware Cherokee had
Delaware Indian blood but, along with the Shawnee Indians, had been adopted
into the Cherokee Nation as part of the same treaty with the U.S. Government
that extended Cherokee citizenship to Freedmen.19 Intermarried whites and
Cherokee Freedmen, however, lacked any Indian blood but were recorded as
citizens of the Cherokee Nation nonetheless.20 Both the 1866 and 1975 versions
of the Cherokee Constitution thus seemingly permitted Cherokee Freedmen
and their descendants to be citizens of the Nation.21 However, in 1993, the
Cherokee Nation enacted 11 C.N.C.A. § 12, which states:
A. Tribal membership is derived only through proof of
Cherokee blood based on the Final Rolls.
B. The Registrar will issue tribal membership to a person
who can prove that he or she is an original enrollee listed
on the Final Rolls by blood or who can prove to at least one
direct ancestor listed by blood on the Final Rolls.22
Under 11 C.N.C.A. § 3, “Definitions,” the Act further clarified that such

CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 1 (amended 1975 version), available at
http://www.cherokee.org/Our-Government/Commissions/Constitution-Convention/1975-CherokeeNation-Constitution.
18 Ray, supra note 13, at 391.
19 Id. at 395.
20 Id. at 391–92 n.15.
21 See CONST. OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 5 (amended 1866 version); see also CONST.
OF THE CHEROKEE NATION, art. III, § 1 (amended 1975 version).
22 11 CHEROKEE NATION CODE ANNOTATED [C.N.C.A.] § 12 (1993), available at
http://www.cherokee.org/Portals/AttorneyGeneral/Users/213/13/213/Word%20Searchable%20Full%2
0Code.pdf?ver=2015-10-22-083614-130.
17
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membership could only be traced to the “Cherokees by Blood,” “Cherokee
Minors by Blood,” “Delaware Cherokees,” and “Shawnee Cherokees”
sections of the Dawes Final Rolls.23
The language of the legislation reflected a clear attempt to limit tribal
membership to only those with some lineal Indian ancestry and
corresponding amounts of Indian blood. This Act was challenged by Lucy
Allen, a descendant of several individuals listed on the Dawes Commission
Rolls as “Cherokee Freedmen.”24 Allen claimed that the legislation was in
conflict with Article III of the 1975 Cherokee Nation Constitution and the
earlier 1866 treaty with the U.S. Government that extended Cherokee
citizenship to the Freedmen.25 Allen thus sought a declaration that the
provision was unconstitutional and that she, like other Freedmen
descendants, was entitled to Cherokee citizenship.26 In its 2006 decision,
the Cherokee Nation’s highest court sided with Allen and ruled that 11
C.N.C.A. § 12 was in conflict with Article III of the Cherokee Constitution
and was thus unconstitutional.27 The court further ruled that the 1866
treaty between the Cherokee Nation and the U.S. Government otherwise
precluded the Cherokee Nation from foreclosing Cherokee citizenship to
descendants of the Cherokee Freedmen, writing that:
[I]f the Cherokee Nation is going to make a decision not to
abide by a previous treaty provision, it must do so by clear
actions which are consistent with the Cherokee Nation
Constitution. A treaty provision cannot be set aside by
mere implication. . . . If the Cherokee people want to
change the legal definition of Cherokee citizenship, they
must do so expressly.28
Taking the Nation’s court up on its words, then-Principal Chief Chad
Smith immediately called for a popular vote upon the definition of tribal
citizenship “once and for all.”29 Chief Smith advocated for the exclusion of

Id. at § 3.
Lucy Allen v. Cherokee Nation Tribunal Council, JAT-04-09, at 1 (Cherokee Nation Judicial Appeals
Tribunal March 7, 2006), https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/12/allen-v-cherokee-nation.pdf.
25 See id. at 2.
26 See id. at 1.
27 Id. at 21.
28 Id. at 20.
29 See Ray, supra note 13, at 392.
23
24
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the Freedmen descendants from the tribal rolls and succinctly described his
position as a belief “that an Indian nation should be composed of Indians.”30
Meanwhile, Marilyn Vann, President of the Descendants of Freedmen of the
Five Civilized Tribes, launched a campaign against the measure. Vann
emphasized the role of the Freedmen in the history of the Cherokee tribe31.
She characterized the dispute in question form, asking: “Is the Cherokee
Nation a ‘race’ or a ‘nation’?”32 By a March 2007 special election, 77% of
voters sided with Chief Smith and against the Freedmen descendants in
declaring “that an Indian nation should be composed of Indians.”33 The
Cherokee Nation proceeded to decline the processing of any Cherokee
Freedmen citizenship applications and later brought suit for a declaration
that Cherokee Freedmen descendants are not entitled to tribal citizenship.34
The named “Freedmen Defendants” then counterclaimed for a declaration
that denial of their citizenship violates the U.S. and Cherokee constitutions,
various federal laws, and the Treaty of 1866 between the Cherokee Nation
and U.S. Government.35 The Nation’s position was subject to criticism in the
media and the general public, and the fight of the Freedmen for recognition
was the subject of a 2016 documentary film.36 After several years of
litigation, a federal court ultimately sided with the Freedmen but largely
refrained from offering any insight into the larger issues raised by the
dispute.37 Rather, the court simply held that the Cherokee Nation was
bound by the contractual language of its 1866 Treaty with the United
States, which required that the Freedmen and their descendants be granted
“all the rights of native Cherokees”—up to and including citizenship in the
Nation.38

Id.
Id., at pg. 397 n. 41.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 394.
34 See Cherokee Nation v. Nash, No. 11-CV-648-TCK-TLW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35996 (N.D. Okla.
March 15, 2013).
35 See id. at *10–11.
36 See, e.g., Nadine Ajaka, Descendants of Cherokee Freedmen Are Being Denied Tribal Rights, THE
ATLANTIC (Dec. 21, 2016).
https://web.archive.org/web/20171022005336/https://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/510728/descen
dants-of-cherokee-freedmen-are-being-denied-tribal-rights/.
37 Cherokee Nation v. Nash, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. August 30, 2017).
38 Id.
30
31
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B. Races, Nations, and Indians
The representative quotations from Chief Smith and Marilyn Vann
in the Cherokee Freedmen dispute raise points of thought that transcend
the citizenship of the Cherokee Freedmen. Chief Smith declared his belief
“that an Indian nation should be composed of Indians,” and a majority of
Cherokee voters endorsed this belief. Vann, meanwhile, questioned whether
the Cherokee Nation was a “‘race’ or a ‘nation’?” and emphasized the role of
the Freedmen in the Nation’s history. Defining “Indian” status—that is,
deciding who is an Indian for legal purposes—and categorizing such status
as a political or racial classification is central to federal criminal jurisdiction
in Indian country, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Indian Health
Service hiring preferences, and a bevy of legislation providing for special
treatment of Indians, such as the Indian Child Welfare Act. However, legal
treatment of “Indian” status in each of these contexts is less than uniform.
There is support in the legal treatment of both Indian tribes and their
Indian citizens for the idea that an Indian nation is at times a race, at times
a nation, and at times a combination of the two. Similarly, the classification
of individuals as “Indian” in different contexts seems to depend on shifting
views of Indian tribes as races, nations, or hybrids. Seemingly, the only
consistent theme in formulation of “Indian status” is convenience and
necessity in reaching or upholding the policy preferences of individual
judges and legislatures.
The way in which society defines and classifies Indian status is of
great importance. Government action that utilizes racial classifications—
even when seeking to “benefit” a given racial group through affirmative
action—must withstand strict scrutiny analysis.39 Strict scrutiny is the
highest standard of Equal Protection and Due Process review, and it
requires that the government prove that its racial classifications “are
narrowly tailored measures that further compelling government
interests.”40 If Indian status is treated as a race-based distinction under
current precedent, the government would carry a heavy burden in each
instance that it utilizes Indian status as a legal classification. To the extent
that Indian status is considered a political classification, however, the

39
40

See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
Id. at 227.
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challenged law need only satisfy the more relaxed rational basis review.
Indeed, under rational basis review, legislation bears a presumption of
constitutionality, and courts are instructed to exercise “judicial restraint” in
reviewing governmental action.41
Section II of this Article will examine treatment of Indian status in
the sphere of criminal law, and Section III will examine Indian status as it
has been treated in the context of civil law. Section IV will discuss
implications of the differing ways in which the law has treated Indian
status, and suggest two alternative approaches.
I. “I N D IA N ” S T A T US

IN

C R IM I N AL L A W

A. Federal Jurisdiction, the Two-Prong Rogers Test, and
United States v. Antelope
In Ex parte Crow Dog, a Sioux Indian named Crow Dog sought a writ
of habeas corpus after being imprisoned by a federal marshal for the murder
of another Sioux Indian, Spotted Tail, in Indian country.42 The Supreme
Court granted Crow Dog’s writ and held that, unless expressly authorized
by Congress, federal courts have no jurisdiction over crimes committed by
Indians, against Indians, in Indian country.43 In response to the Court’s
decision, Congress passed the General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and
the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153.44 The General Crimes Act extends
federal law and federal jurisdiction to offenses committed in Indian country
by Indians against non-Indians and vice versa.45 Meanwhile, the Major
Crimes Act extends federal jurisdiction to certain Indian-on-Indian offenses

See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–314 (1993) (describing rational basis
review as “a paradigm of judicial restraint”).
42 109 U.S. 556, 557 (1883).
43 Id. at 571–72. (holding that it was inappropriate to extend the law of United States over Indians—
“aliens and strangers”—for: “[i]t tries them, not by their peers, nor by the customs of their people,
nor the law of their land, but by superiors of a different race, according to the law of a social state of
which they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the traditions of their history, to
the habits of their lives, to the strongest prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the
red man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.”).
44 Daniel Donovan & John Rhodes, To Be or Not to Be: Who is an “Indian Person”?, 73 MONT. L. REV.
61, 62–63 (2012).
45 Id. at 62.
41
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in Indian country, including murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, arson,
burglary, and robbery.46 The Major Crimes Act was upheld by the Supreme
Court in United States. v. Kagama.47 As an early formulation of Congress’s
plenary power over the affairs of the Indian tribes, the Kagama Court held
that Congress necessarily has a virtually unchecked power to enact
legislation that governs the Indian tribes as a result of the tribes’ statuses
as “wards of the nation” and “communities dependent on the United
States.”48
Neither the General Crimes Act nor the Major Crimes Act provides a
definition of who is an “Indian,” but status as an “Indian” is central to
federal criminal jurisdiction in each act. For instance, when the government
prosecutes an individual under the Major Crimes Act, they must allege in
the indictment and prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that the
defendant is indeed an “Indian.”49 Indian status has become in some cases
a tangled issue of fact. When framed in the context of the Cherokee
Freedmen controversy, legal treatment of Indian status in the criminal law
arena can perhaps be generalized as embracing Chief Smith’s declaration
that “an Indian nation should be composed of Indians,” while reserving that
Indian blood, alone, does not make one an Indian.
One of the early treatments of status as an Indian is found in the
peculiar case of United States v. Rogers.50 Therein, the Supreme Court was
presented with a defendant who challenged his indictment under the laws
of the United States, because he had:
voluntarily removed to the Cherokee country, and made it
his home, without any intention of returning to the United
States, that he incorporated himself with the said tribe of
Indians as one of them, and was so treated, recognized, and
adopted by the said tribe, and the proper authorities
thereof, and exercised all the rights and privileges of a
Cherokee Indian in the said tribe, and was domiciled in
their country; that by these acts he became a citizen of the

18 U.S.C. § 1153.
118 U.S. 375 (1886).
48 Id. at 383–84.
49 Donovan & Rhodes, supra note 42, at 63. See also United States v. LaBuff, 658 F.3d 873, 877 (9th
Cir. 2011).
50 United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846).
46
47
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Cherokee nation, and was, and still is, a Cherokee Indian,
within the true intent and meaning of the act of Congress
in that behalf made and provided.51
The Court rejected the man’s plea because “[w]hatever
obligations the prisoner may have taken upon himself by
becoming a Cherokee by adoption . . . he was still a white man,
of the white race, and therefore not within the exception in the
act of Congress.”52
The dated Rogers decision stands for the idea that Indian status has
both a racial and a political prong. And courts continue to rely on and apply
Rogers for purposes of proving Indian status in a criminal prosecution by
“ask[ing] whether the defendant (1) has some Indian blood, and (2) is
recognized as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government.”53
Federal jurisdiction in Indian Country, combined with the two-prong
Rogers test, means that certain criminal defendants deemed “Indians” will
be subjected to federal laws, prosecution, and penalties on the basis of their
Indian status, whereas similarly situated non-Indians would otherwise be
subject to state criminal law. In United States v. Antelope, a group of
criminal defendants belonging to the Coeur d’Alene tribe brought a Fifth
Amendment challenge to this scheme.54 The Indian defendants committed
a robbery and burglary in Idaho but were also charged with and convicted
of first-degree murder under federal felony murder provisions, as the elderly
homeowner died during the robbery. The defendants were subject to federal
jurisdiction and federal law by way of their Indian status and the Major
Crimes Act. However, Idaho state law lacked an analogous felony murder
provision.55 Thus, in a prosecution involving a similarly-situated nonIndian, the prosecution would have had to prove premeditation and
deliberation to support a first-degree murder charge under Idaho state
law.56 But by no reason other than their Indian status, the defendants in
this case were subject to a federal felony murder provision that allowed
them to be convicted of first-degree murder in the absence of premeditation

51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 571.
Id. at 573.
See, e.g., United States v. Stymiest, 581 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2009).
United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977).
Id., at 643-44.
Id., at 644.
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or deliberation—the federal prosecution need only show that a death
occurred during the commission of their crime.57 On this basis, the
defendants challenged the Major Crimes Act as unconstitutional and
violative of due process, reasoning that they were subject to a stricter
federal statutory scheme on the basis of an impermissible racial
classification—that is, their status as “Indian.” The Ninth Circuit was
inclined to agree, holding that the difference between Idaho and federal law
“put [the defendants] at a serious racially-based disadvantage.”58 However,
the Supreme Court reversed and rejected the defendants’ challenge. The
Court first reasoned that “federal regulation of Indian affairs is not based
upon impermissible [racial] classifications,” but rather “is rooted in the
unique status of Indians as a ‘separate people’ with their own political
institutions.”59 By this understanding, the defendants “were not subjected
to federal criminal jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but
because they are enrolled members of the Coeur d’Alene tribe.”60 The Court
then concluded that, because the federal statutory scheme was applied
evenhandedly and equally to all those subject to it—Indian or non-Indian—
the defendants’ challenge was invalid.61
B. Uneven Approaches To Indian Status
Given the Supreme Court’s decision and reasoning in Antelope, one
might expect for courts to treat the racial prong of Rogers as a cursory
exercise or abandon it all together. And one might also expect that the
political prong requires that a criminal defendant be an “enrolled member
of . . . [a] tribe.”62 Neither has held true, however, and courts have taken
inconsistent approaches and reached inconsistent results under the twoprong Rogers test.
Case law indicates that tribal enrollment is neither necessary nor
sufficient for Indian status.63 The Ninth Circuit, for example, holds that the

Id. at 644.
United States v. Antelope, 523 F.2d 400, 406 (9th Cir. 1975).
59 Antelope, 430 U.S. at 646.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 648–49.
62 Id. at 646.
63 See United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1979) (noting that tribal
enrollment is not “an absolute requirement . . . [n]or should it be”).
57
58
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political prong can be established “in declining order of importance,” by
evidence of: “(1) tribal enrollment; (2) government recognition formally and
informally through receipt of assistance reserved only to Indians; (3)
enjoyment of the benefits of tribal affiliation; and (4) social recognition as
an Indian through residence on a reservation and participation in Indian
social life.”64
The Eighth Circuit adopted this same framework in United States v.
Stymiest.65 There, it upheld a set of jury instructions that provided relevant
factors in determining whether the second prong of Rogers—recognition as
an Indian—is met, including:
[E]nrollment in a tribe . . . government recognition formally
or informally through providing the defendant assistance
reserved only to Indians . . . tribal recognition formally or
informally through subjecting the defendant to tribal court
jurisdiction . . . enjoying the benefits of tribal affiliation;
and . . . social recognition as an Indian through living on a
reservation and participating in Indian social life, including
whether the defendant holds himself out as an Indian.66
The court further noted that “there is no single correct way to instruct
a jury on this issue.” 67 In other words, there is no definite set of factors that
conclusively make a defendant an Indian or non-Indian.
The Eighth Circuit has accordingly adopted a loose approach to Indian
status. In United States v. Dodge, it held that defendants who presented
themselves socially as Indians and possessed Indian blood were “Indians”
for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, independent of tribal affiliation.68
And in United States v. Pemberton, it upheld the Indian status of a criminal
defendant who was not enrolled in any federally-recognized tribe.69 The
court relied on evidence that the defendant’s mother was an enrolled tribal
member, he was born and attended school on the tribal reservation, he
presented as an Indian in social contexts, and he had a daughter who lived

64
65
66
67
68
69

United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215, 1223–24 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
581 F.3d 759, 763 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
Id. at 764.
538 F.2d 770, 786 (8th Cir. 1976).
405 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2005).
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with her mother on the reservation.70
In United States v. Cruz, the Ninth Circuit, however, took a relatively
stricter approach to Indian status and concluded that Indian blood, without
conclusive tribal recognition of a defendant as an Indian, does not make one
an “Indian.”71 The defendant, Cruz, had 22% Blackfeet and 25% total Indian
blood and was the son of an enrolled member of the Blackfeet Tribe. Though
not enrolled in the Blackfeet Tribe himself, Cruz held “descendant” status,
which entitled him to use of Indian Health Services, certain educational
grants, and fishing and hunting rights on the tribal reservation. Cruz also
lived on the Reservation as a child, was subject to the jurisdiction of the
tribal court as an “Indian” in prosecution for an offense, attended school,
and worked on the tribal reservation.72 However, because Cruz was not an
officially enrolled member of the tribe and had otherwise not taken
advantage of “descendant” status privileges, participated in cultural
ceremonies, voted in tribal elections, or held a tribal identification card, the
court held that Cruz had not been proven to be an Indian for purposes of a
prosecution under the Major Crimes Act.73 The court otherwise noted the
importance of demonstrating a “sufficient non-racial link to a formerly
sovereign people,” lest Indian status be transformed into a “simple blood
test.”74
Even if the Indian status inquiry involves more than a “simple blood
test,” the maintenance of the Rogers racial prong means that all cases
necessarily rise, and some fall, on the basis of such a test. The Tenth
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Diaz accordingly stands for the idea
that tribal recognition and affiliation, without the racial aspect of Indian
blood, is an insufficient basis for Indian status.75 In Diaz, the Indian
defendant argued that the government had failed to prove the non-Indian
status of the victim, and thus federal jurisdiction under the General Crimes
Act—which applies to Indian-on-non-Indian (and vice versa) crimes in
Indian country—was lacking. The court overruled Diaz’s objection and
found evidence that the victim was descended from “Sephardic” or “Hispanic
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Id. at 658–61.
554 F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 846–47.
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Jews,” and lacked any Indian ancestry. This apparent absence of Indian
descent was sufficient to demonstrate non-Indian status, even though the
victim was an enrolled member of an Indian pueblo, with active tribal
affiliation.76 The decision in Diaz relied on an earlier Tenth Circuit decision,
United States v. Prentiss, wherein the court held that stipulation and
testimony that two victims were members of the Tesuque Pueblo did not
meet the standard for proving their Indian status, as it “[did] not establish
that either of them had any Indian blood.”77 Moreover, courts treat the
racial prong as wholly independent of the political prong—requiring only
“proof of some quantum of Indian blood, whether or not that blood derives
from” an ancestor who was a member of any federally-recognized tribe, let
alone the tribe upon which the political prong has been satisfied.78 These
results seemingly undercut the basis for the decision in United States v.
Antelope—that federal jurisdiction results from political affiliation with a
tribe, as opposed to the defendant’s racial status and Indian heritage.79
The two-prong test of United States v. Rogers nonetheless remains,
by all judicial accounts, good law in establishing the Indian status of a
defendant. However, one must wonder why official tribal recognition and
affiliation, as in the cases of Diaz and Prentiss, or Indian blood combined
with significant tribal ties that apparently fall just short of official
recognition, as in Cruz, are not independently sufficient demonstrations of
Indian status. The reality is that both the political and racial formulations
of Indian status are necessary to fulfill the prerogatives of federal
jurisdiction over Indian defendants. The Rogers test persists out of
convenience and necessity.
The racial prong of the Rogers test—Indian blood—provides a
convenient litmus test from which to begin proof of Indian status. It is also
convenient—or, perhaps, necessary—in fulfilling Congress’s intent in
asserting jurisdiction over certain crimes and certain defendants in Indian
country. This is apparent from the very outset of the test in United States
v. Rogers itself. The Supreme Court there noted the necessity of certain
forms of federal jurisdiction in Indian country, as prescribed by Congress,
in order to maintain peace and order in and among the Indian tribes. In

Id. at 1187–88.
273 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2001).
78 United States v. Zepeda, 792 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir. 2015). Note, however, that the political
prong requires that the defendant be affiliated with a tribe that enjoys current federal recognition
(as opposed to terminated tribes, tribe with mere state recognition, or loose historical status as a
tribe). See id.; LaPier v. McCormick, 986 F.2d 303, 304–06 (9th Cir. 1993).
79 430 U.S. at 646.
76
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rationalizing the necessity of the racial prong of Indian status, the Court
reasoned that:
[I]t would perhaps be found difficult to preserve peace
among [the tribes], if white men of every description might
at pleasure settle among them, and, by procuring an
adoption by one of the tribes, throw off all responsibility to
the laws of the United States, and claim to be treated by
the government and its officers as if they were Indians
born. It can hardly be supposed that Congress intended to
grant such exemptions, especially to men of that class who
are most likely to become Indians by adoption, and who will
generally be found the most mischievous and dangerous
inhabitants of the Indian country.80
Fears of tribally-adopted White outlaws, “the most mischievous and
dangerous inhabitants of the Indian country,” evading federal law are
unfounded in modern times. However, the racial prong of the Rogers test
still serves the congressional intent of the modern General Crimes Act. A
racial non-Indian who commits a non-Major Crimes Act offense against an
Indian in Indian country, for instance, cannot avoid federal jurisdiction
under the General Crimes Act by claiming to have been adopted, recognized
by, or otherwise affiliated with an Indian tribe. The critic might note that
Rogers is outdated, in the sense that recordkeeping is much more
standardized and rigorous now than in our earlier history. But given the
loose approach to political affiliation that courts have adopted, one could see
the non-Indian spouse or longtime resident of Indian Country claiming to
be so involved in tribal society and culture as to have acquired legal “Indian”
status. The racial prong of Rogers preemptively forecloses any such inquiry.
The political prong of the Rogers test—tribal or governmental
recognition as an Indian—is also necessary to fulfill congressional intent.
Indeed, without including the political prong of the Rogers test, Indian
status for the purpose of federal jurisdiction would violate due process and
equal protection rights as a pure racial classification or “simple [racial]
blood test.”81 The political prong serves as a fallback provision that
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45 U.S. 567, 573 (1846).
United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840, 849 (9th Cir. 2009).
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preserves the Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act against
constitutional challenges. The Supreme Court’s decision in Antelope is
instructive on this point.82
Taken together and as applied by subsequent courts, the racial and
political prongs of the Rogers test serve a further practical convenience. As
United States v. Cruz demonstrates, proving Indian status in a prosecution
can be a fact-intensive, uncertain endeavor. However, once the government
has offered objective evidence that a defendant satisfies the racial prong—
that is, has Indian blood—and the political prong—that is, recognition as an
Indian by a tribe or government—they have met their burden. A defendant
cannot then turn their prosecution into a mini-trial on their subjective selfidentification that otherwise negates federal jurisdiction. Such was the
underlying basis for the result in United States v. Juvenile Male.83 There, a
juvenile defendant appealed his conviction under the Major Crimes Act to
the Ninth Circuit. The juvenile admitted to having Indian blood. The
juvenile also admitted that he was an enrolled tribal member, lived on a
tribal reservation, received tribal assistance, and otherwise enjoyed the
benefits of tribal affiliation.84 The juvenile contended, though, that he did
not see himself as “Indian” and was not socially recognized as such.85 The
court overruled these arguments and held that although “[s]ocial and
subjective non-recognition as Indian may prove to be relevant in a closer
case,” it could not outweigh the substantial proof in favor of each Rogers
prong as applied in Ninth Circuit precedent.86
The racial and political prongs make sense when viewed as providing
flexibility and legality to the Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act.
When viewed in the context of individual cases however, it becomes difficult
to identify consistency and logical coherency. For instance, use of Indian
status for purposes of the federal criminal jurisdiction scheme was upheld
in Antelope as involving a political classification rather than a racial one.
However, in applying this scheme and Indian status in United States v.
Pemberton, the Eighth Circuit held that a defendant with Indian blood—
even though not an enrolled member of any federally-recognized tribe—was
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430 U.S. 641 (1977).
United States v. Juvenile Male, 666 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2012).
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an Indian for purposes of federal jurisdiction because testimony showed that
he had presented himself as an Indian in social contexts.87 This focus on
blood, ancestry, and self-identification—despite lack of tribal government
recognition—sounds of pure racial classification as compared to a political
classification. Similarly, in Martin v. United States, a federal court refused
the defendant’s challenge to his Indian status, even though he was not
enrolled in a tribe and apparently did not meet the necessary blood quantum
requirements for such enrollment in the Red Lake Band of Chippewa
Indians.88 And the Tenth Circuit’s decisions in Prentiss and Diaz are based
on the idea that, even where official political recognition exists, Indian
status hinges on race and heritage.89 Such decisions might make sense from
a realist perspective—that is, in accomplishing policy goals and tabbing an
Indian as an Indian—but they undercut the very logic of the precedential
foundation from which they extend. The decisions in this arena are hard to
square with one another and often consist of questionable factual
distinctions and resulting conclusions. Compare, for instance, the
Pemberton decision and the Cruz dissent against the Cruz majority opinion
that treated a defendant who had 22% Blackfeet and 25% total Indian blood,
attended a reservation school, was prosecuted as an Indian in tribal court,
and committed his crime on the tribal reservation, as a non-Indian.90
II.

“I N D IA N ” S T A T US

IN

C I VI L L A W

A. Upholding Differential Treatment s: Mancari and its Progeny
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (Wheeler-Howard Act)
represented a progressive-era paradigm shift in U.S. policy towards Indians
and tribes, emphasizing Indian self-government and tribal sovereignty.91

United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 662 (8th Cir. 2005).
Martin v. United States, No. 12-206(1) (DWF/LIB); 15-2210 (DWF), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25508
(D. Minn. Feb. 17, 2017).
89 United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Diaz, 679 F.3d
1183, 1187–88 (10th Cir. 2012) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
90 United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. Cruz, 554 F.3d 840 (9th
Cir. 2009).
91 See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future of Tribal SelfGovernance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 1, 14–15 (2015) (noting that the Wheeler-Howard Act represented a major shift in federal policy
87
88
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One statutory provision that was introduced as part of the Act, 25 U.S.C. §
5116 (formerly 25 U.S.C. § 472), codifies a preference for employment of
Indians over non-Indians in the BIA. The statute provides, simply, that the
Secretary of the Interior: is directed to establish standards . . . without
regard to civil-service laws, to the various positions maintained . . . by the
Indian Office, in the administration of functions or services affecting any
Indian tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the preference to
appointment to vacancies in any such positions.92 Thus, the Indian Health
Service website states that:
The Indian Health Service is required by law to provide
absolute preference in employment to American Indians
and Alaska Natives who are enrolled in a federally
recognized tribe as defined by the Secretary of the Interior.
Indian preference requirements apply to all actions involved
in filling a vacant position (e.g., initial hiring,
reassignment,
transfer,
competitive
promotion,
reappointment or reinstatement), no matter how the
vacancy arises.93
Similarly, the BIA provides that:
Indian Preference affords absolute hiring preference to
qualified Indian individuals . . . . Indian Preference applies
to the initial hiring, reassignment, transfer, competitive
promotion, reappointment, reinstatement, or any personnel
action intended to fill a vacant position.
When one or more qualified Indian Preference applicants
apply for an advertised vacancy, non-Indian applicants will
not be initially rated nor referred to the selecting official for

and “attempted to revitalize tribal self-government by providing for formal adoption of tribal
constitutions, tribal corporations, and formal tribal membership enrollment procedures”).
92 25 U.S.C. § 5116 (Supp. IV 2013–2017).
93
INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE, https://www.ihs.gov/careeropps/indianpreference/ (last visited Aug. 22,
2018) (emphasis added).
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consideration.94
Indian preference not only gives absolute preference to Indians over nonIndians, but also supersedes any other federal government hiring
preferences, such as those reserved for military veterans.95
The Supreme Court was faced with a challenge to such Indian
employment preferences in Morton v. Mancari.96 There, a group of nonIndian federal employees challenged the preference as violative of the Due
Process Clause, and otherwise impliedly repealed by the 1972 Equal
Employment Opportunity Act. In a questionable analysis, the Court jumped
from noting the plenary power of Congress in dealing with Indian tribes, to
the “special relationship” between the federal government and Indian
tribes, to its holding that:
[T]his
preference
does
not
constitute
“racial
discrimination.” Indeed, it is not even a “racial” preference.
Rather, it is an employment criterion reasonably designed
to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make
the BIA more responsive to the needs of its constituent
groups. . . . The preference, as applied, is granted to
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and
activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.97
Arguably, though, responsiveness to the needs of such constituent
groups and an understanding of the BIA’s role in governing tribal entities
could serve as the basis for evaluating, hiring, and promoting employees,
without regard to Indian or non-Indian status. The Court further noted that
“[t]he preference is not directed towards a ‘racial’ group consisting of
‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes.
This operates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified
as ‘Indians.’ In this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in

BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, The Indian Preference Law Fact Sheet,
https://www.bia.gov/sites/bia.gov/files/assets/public/webteam/pdf/idc1-025252.pdf (emphasis added).
95 See id.
96 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 535 (1974).
97 Id. at 553–54.
94
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nature.”98
To determine the scope of Mancari, it is important to look at how the
Court reached its result. In emphasizing “the unique legal status of Indian
tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power of Congress,” the Court
drew “both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution itself.” 99 “Article
I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . .
with the Indian Tribes,’ and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a
proper subject for separate legislation.”100 Meanwhile, “Article II, § 2, cl. 2,
gives the President the power, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, to make treaties.”101 The Court thus recognized that, acting under
these two constitutional clauses, Congress and the Executive had
established a “historical and legal context” for “singl[ing] out Indians for
particular and special treatment.”102
The Supreme Court has applied Morton v. Mancari in a number of
cases. In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, the Court noted
that although “[t]he power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a
plenary nature . . . it is not absolute.”103 Relying on Mancari, it stated that
the appropriate standard of review is that “legislative judgment[s] should
not be disturbed ‘[a]s long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to
the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.’”104 In
United States. v. Antelope, discussed above, the Court stated that Mancari
extends to federal legislation involving both “preferences [and] disabilities,”
and to Congress’ broader power of “federal regulation” over Indian affairs,
as opposed to a narrower power to promote “tribal self-regulation” through
supportive legislation.105
The Supreme Court was soon faced with the question as to whether
Mancari extends to differential treatments of Indians under state law. In
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, it
first noted Mancari had “settled that ‘the unique legal status of Indian

Id. at 553 n.24.
Id. at 551–52 (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 552.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 553, 554–55.
103 Delaware Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977) (quoting United States v. Alcea
Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946) (plurality opinion)).
104
Id. at 85 (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555).
105
430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977).
98
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tribes under federal law’ permits the Federal Government to enact
legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be
constitutionally offensive.”106 It then recognized that “[s]tates do not enjoy
this same unique relationship with Indians.”107 But it found that the
legislation at hand was “not simply another state law,” but rather one
“enacted in response to a federal measure explicitly designed to readjust the
allocation of jurisdiction over Indians.”108 It thus upheld a scheme of limited
state jurisdiction over Indian Country pursuant to Congress’ authorization
through Public Law 280. In its conclusion, the Court suggested that, in the
arena of Indian affairs, states may “[legislate] under explicit authority
granted by Congress” without running afoul of the Equal Protection Clause,
provided that Congress has properly “exercise[d] . . . federal power” in its
authorization.109
B. Inconsistent Treatments of Mancari in the Lower Courts
The racial-political distinction in Morton v. Mancari has since been
applied to uphold preferences and special treatment of Indians in various
arenas against Due Process and Equal Protection challenges. The
distinction serves as a continuing basis for upholding Indian status
determinations for purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction (since United
States v. Antelope, discussed above), even though a number of cases have
allowed for federal jurisdiction over defendants with Indian blood, but no
tribal enrollment or significant tribal affiliation.110 It was the basis for
rejecting the State of Montana’s claim that a sales tax immunity for Indians,
not available to non-Indians under parallel circumstances, violated the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses.111 It was also used in rejecting a
North Carolina criminal defendant’s Equal Protection argument, where he
was charged and convicted of conducting a video gambling operation that

Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500–01
(1979) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551–52).
107 Id. at 501.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 See United States v. Pemberton, 405 F.3d 656, 659–60 (8th Cir. 2005); Martin v. United States,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25508, at *12–13 (D. Minn. 2017). See supra text accompanying notes 76–77.
111
Moe v. Confederate Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463, 479–81
(1976).
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was identical to legal gambling enterprises conducted by Indians in the
state.112 Mancari was also featured in an interesting Fifth Circuit decision
on the subject of peyote use, Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v.
Thornburgh.113 There, the court upheld the enforcement of federal and state
drug laws against a peyote church that mirrored the beliefs of the Native
American Church, used peyote as a sacrament in bona fide religious
ceremony, maintained detailed records, and sincerely regarded peyote as
appropriate for religious, and only religious, ceremony.114 This holding was
made despite the fact that the Native American Church was the only church
expressly exempted from the same peyote laws, and it only afforded
membership to those with a specified Indian blood quantum, without regard
to tribal membership. Because of Mancari, the court was able essentially to
sidestep the issue of sincerity of religious beliefs and Equal Protection.115 In
short, Mancari is central to a number of legal decisions that uphold the
differential treatment of Indian and non-Indian individuals in a variety of
contexts and for a variety of purposes.
It follows, both naturally from Mancari and more specifically from
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, that
rational basis review extends to state-law classifications existing because of
and pursuant to congressional authorization—states can be useful partners
(or agents) in carrying out federal prerogatives. Perhaps the best example
of this is the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which affords
states some role in the regulation of gaming and gambling in Indian
Country, and establishes a framework for states and tribes to enter into
cooperative compacts by which tribes conduct Class III gaming in Indian
Country.116 Accordingly, courts have rejected challenges to these underlying

United States v. Garrett, 122 Fd. App’x 628 (4th Cir. 2005).
Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
114
Id. at 1212–13.
115
See id. at 1214–16.
116 25 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 (2012); contra California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 408 U.S. 202,
216–22 (1987) (rejecting state regulatory jurisdiction over tribal gaming) superseded by statute, 25
U.S.C. § 2701, as recognized in Michigan v. Bay Hills Indian Cmty., No.12-515 (May 27, 2014). Thus,
IGRA was enacted as a congressional compromise that sought to allow “cooperative federalism” in
the field of Indian gaming, balancing the competing interests of federal, state, and tribal
governments. IGRA thus allows Indian tribes to conduct casino-style gambling under tribal-state
compacts, but allows states some oversight in order to prevent the perceived threat of outside
influence from organized crime that such gaming attracts.
112
113
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state-tribal compacts from non-Indians as violative of Equal Protection by
relying on Mancari.117
Lower courts remain split, however, as to the circumstances in which
Mancari insulates differential state-law treatments of Indians and nonIndians beyond those explicitly authorized by federal legislation. Courts
have also struggled with classifications that advance the general interests
of individual Indians as opposed to tribal interests within the scope of the
unique federal-tribal relationship.
As with the case law on Indian status for purposes of federal criminal
jurisdiction, the treatment of Indian status classification in these
circumstances is difficult to rectify with any consistent theme. For instance,
in Livingston v. Ewing, the Tenth Circuit upheld the application of Mancari
in the context of Indian artists and craftsmen selling wares at the Museum
of New Mexico and Palace of the Governors in Santa Fe.118 There, nonIndians brought an Equal Protection claim against a state program
extending preference to Indian artists, and to the complete exclusion of
similarly situated non-Indians, who were allowed the special, sole right to
sell crafts and jewelry on the state-owned grounds.119 The court held that
this was not racial discrimination per Mancari and rejected an attempt to
differentiate Mancari as applying only to employment practices.120 The
result reached by the Tenth Circuit in Livingston is remarkable in that it
extended Mancari—which was based on the unique political relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes—to state-law
classifications that were not explicitly authorized by federal legislation from
Congress and that lacked any substantial connection to tribal interests in
self-government.121 Meanwhile, the federal court in Tafoya v. Albuquerque
held that an Indian preference ordinance, which extended vending licenses
only to members of federally recognized tribes or pueblos in New Mexico and
members of the Navajo Nation, was founded on a suspect-racial

See Artichoke Joe’s Cal. Grand Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003); Flynt v. Cal.
Gambling Control Comm’n, 104 Cal. App. 4th 1125 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); United States v. Garrett,
122 F. App’x. 628 (4th Cir. 2005).
118 Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979).
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1113–15.
121 Id. This is in conflict with the court’s later decision in Navajo Nation v. New Mexico, where it
treated New Mexico’s actions directed at the political entity of the Navajo Nation as a racial
classification subject to strict scrutiny. 975 F.2d 741, 743–45 (10th Cir. 1992).
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classification and thus subject to strict scrutiny—under which it failed and
was struck down as violative of the Equal Protection Clause.122 And the
Tenth Circuit in Navajo Nation v. New Mexico struck down the State of New
Mexico’s decision to cut funding from a program providing home care to
members of the Navajo Nation in order to cover a budget shortfall for more
general state programs.123 Although it avoided the district court’s clear
treatment of the Navajo Nation as a racial group, the Tenth Circuit
nonetheless framed the state action within the context of impermissible,
race-based discrimination. No mention of Morton v. Mancari or its general
principle was made. Indeed, the court concluded that:
When a state begins with a system in which funds are being distributed
equitably among various racial groups, and then cuts one group’s funding
discriminatorily without showing that that group’s need has lessened, the
undeniable result is a disparity in the adequacy of services provided among
the groups. . . . [T]he state may not continue its disparately low funding
based on the unconstitutional cut.124
Further, the court referred to the Navajo Nation as a “race or nationalitybased organization,” and members of the Navajo Nation as a “racially
identifiable population.”125
Uneven logic and results are not confined to the federal courts of the
Tenth Circuit. The federal court for the District of Minnesota, citing to
Livingston v. Ewing, upheld a state housing program that offered special
funding to individual Indians in urban (off-reservation) settings.126 The
court interpreted the federal-tribal trust doctrine as applying on an equal
basis to state action, and concluded that the Minnesota legislature was “not
barred by the equal protection clause or civil rights statutes” from providing
special funding and programs for individual Indians to the exclusion of nonIndians.127 Relying on this federal case, a Minnesota appellate court upheld
the preferential treatment of Indian teachers with less seniority than nonIndian teachers.128 During a budget shortfall, a number of non-Indian

Tafoya v. Albuquerque, 751 F. Supp. 1527, 1531 (D.N.M. 1990).
Navajo Nation v. New Mexico, 975 F.2d 741, 745–46 (10th Cir. 1992).
124 Id. at 745–46.
125 Id. at 743.
126 See St. Paul Intertribal Housing Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1412–13 (D. Minn. 1983).
127 Id. at 1413.
128 Krueth v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 38, 496 N.W. 2d 829 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
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teachers were fired or placed on unpaid leave while Indian teachers retained
their position.129 The court held that the “trust doctrine also applies to state
action,” so the preferential treatment of Indian teachers did not violate
equal protection for the non-Indian teachers—it was deemed “rationally
related” to interests in increasing the number of Indian teachers and
responding to cultural and academic needs of Indian students.130
Meanwhile, a Florida appellate court reached an opposite result in a
situation much more analogous to Mancari.131 Faced with an Indian
employment preference, the court held “that Indian preference is legal
under Federal law is irrelevant; what is legal under Federal law is not the
same as what is legal under Florida law.”132 The court’s logic rested on the
idea that the federal-tribal trust doctrine did not translate to the state of
Florida, and the Florida preference did not otherwise touch on any unique
aspect of the federal-tribal relationship—even though the preference
promoted Indian employment on a state council for Indian affairs.133
The inconsistent application of Morton v. Mancari and differing treatment
of the racial/political distinction by lower federal courts was acknowledged
by the federal district court in KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick.134
There, the court reluctantly applied rational-basis scrutiny to a state Indian
preference law. The decision made various statements critical of Morton v.
Mancari, including that:
The government's power to regulate Indian affairs, which
implicates weighty constitutional issues, should not rise or
fall on a facile distinction. "Federally recognized Indian
tribes" are quasi-sovereign political entities, to be sure,
which is why some courts characterize the classification as
political. Their members, however, share more than a likeminded spirit of civic participation; they share the same

Id., at 836-37.
Id. Had the policy been examined under strict scrutiny, it hardly could have been deemed narrowly
tailored to the asserted interests. Nor is it clear that increasing the representation of a single racial
group in a given occupation is a “compelling” governmental interest, particularly when it overrides
the accrued seniority and tenure of non-Indians.
131 Tuveson v. Fla. Governor’s Council on Indian Affairs, Inc., 495 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
132 Id. at 793-94.
133 See id.
134 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403 (D. Mass. 2012).
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racial heritage. . . . Mancari ignores this crucial fact and
proceeds from the irrational assumption that race is
"nothing more than a politically meaningless classification
based on ancestry" and that "tribal membership is purely
a matter of voluntary civic participation.”135
The court also stated that, if “addressing the issue as one of first impression,
it would treat Indian tribal status as a quasi-political, quasi-racial
classification subject to varying levels of scrutiny depending on the
authority making it and the interests at stake.”136 However, it found itself
bound to honor Mancari, based on its interpretation of language from
certain Supreme Court holdings. On appeal, however, the First Circuit
reversed this ruling, and held that:
[I]t is quite doubtful that Mancari’s language can be
extended to apply to preferential state classifications based
on tribal status. Mancari itself relied on several sources of
federal authority to reach its holding, including the portion
of the Commerce Clause relating to Indian tribes, the treaty
power, and the special trust relationship between Indian
tribes and the federal government. The states have no
equivalent authority.137
The First Circuit then relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rice v.
Cateyano—in which the Court declined to extend its holding Mancari to
Native Hawaiians, despite a similar special trust relationship—and
indicated that a state Indian preference statute is subject to strict scrutiny,
because “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for race.”138

Id. at 403–04.
Id. at 404.
137 KG Urban Enters.v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2012). The First Circuit referenced the
Supreme Court’s application of strict scrutiny to a Native Hawaiian preference in Rice v. Cateyano,
where the Supreme Court limited its holding in Mancari to Indian tribes—despite various
similarities between U.S.-Indian and U.S.-Hawaiian relations, including a similar trust doctrine—
applied strict scrutiny, and struck down the preference, noting that “[a]ncestry can be a proxy for
race.” 528 U.S. 495 (2000). The First Circuit thus remanded the case, and said that summary
judgment disposition of the Equal Protection claim was actually premature, and essentially
sanctioned lower courts in differentiating Morton v. Mancari as only applying to federal laws, not
state laws.
138 Id. at 19–20 (quoting Rice v. Cateyano, 528 U.S. 495, 514 (2000)).
135
136
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In Malabed v. North Slope Borough, three courts combined to speak
on Mancari’s application to state-law preferences.139 The case involved a
political subdivision of Alaska, North Slope Borough. Six of the seven
members of the Borough’s council, along with its mayor, were Inupiat
Eskimos. Armed with a favorable opinion letter from the federal EEOC, the
mayor introduced and the Borough adopted a strong Indian employment
preference code for all Borough hiring. The plaintiff in the case brought suit
after he was hired but had his position abruptly terminated, then reopened
and filled by an Indian candidate.140 The federal district court held that the
employment preference was subject to strict scrutiny and violated equal
protection principles. It stated that the Borough had “no constitutional
mandate” nor “constitutional authority to enact remedial ordinances
designed to cure general societal discrimination.”141 And it rejected any
attempt to apply Mancari to the case at hand. The court noted that states
do not have the same trust relationship toward Indians as the federal
government, and otherwise explained that an employment preference with
the Borough did not protect any unique tribal or cultural interests.142 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Alaska Supreme Court:
whether the employment preference violated any provision of Alaska
statutory or constitutional law.143 The Alaska Supreme Court also refused
to apply Mancari and rejected the “notion that the Alaska Constitution
radiates implied guardianship powers allowing the state or its boroughs to
treat Alaska Native as if they were wards.”144 The court further noted that
the “federal government’s . . . powers . . . spring directly from the express
powers granted to Congress in the United States Constitution’s Indian
Commerce and Treaty clauses.”145 There is no such authority to “implicitly
grant parallel powers to state and municipal governments” in the regulation
of Indian affairs.146 On this basis, the court concluded that the Borough

Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 42 F. Supp. 2d 927 (D. Alaska 1999).
Id. at 929.
141 Id. at 939.
142 Id. at 937–39.
143 Malabed v. North Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 418 (Alaska 2003); Malabed v. North Slope Borough,
335 F.3d 864, 866 (9th Cir. 2003).
144 Malabed, 70 P.3d at 422 (Alaska 2003).
145 Id.
146 Id.
139
140
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lacked any “legitimate interest in enacting the disputed preference.”147
Having received the court’s response, the Ninth Circuit rested its decision
on the conclusion that the employment preference violated the Alaska
guarantee of equal protection.148 But the Ninth Circuit made the point, in a
footnote, that “Mancari held only that when Congress acts to fulfill its
unique trust responsibilities toward Indian tribes, such legislation is not
based on suspect classification”; extending the racial-political classification
beyond this context of the federal-tribal relationship “puts more weight on
Mancari than it can bear.”149
Morton v. Mancari, and its general holding—that Indian status is a
political classification tied to the sovereign Indian tribes, not a racial one—
remains foundational to modern Indian legislation and case law. However,
just as with the criminal cases discussed in the above section, a number of
lower courts have made factual and legal distinctions in deciding whether
Indian status is a racial or political classification. Thus, the issue of when
lower and state courts—and individual judges—will apply Morton v.
Mancari to state and local classifications based on Indian status remains
unresolved. In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling that
modifies or clarifies the scope of Mancari, this unsettled status is necessary
in affording judges some level of flexibility. Of course what the “right” or
“wrong” use of this discretion and flexibility may be is highly subjective and
depends on individual preferences. But requiring that Morton v. Mancari be
applied liberally, to all state and local laws, ordinances, regulations, and
rules of any subject matter, and to all manner of government action, would
raise serious questions in fringe cases. This also applies to some federal
legislation, because even Congress’ “plenary power” must be moored to the
federal-tribal relationship. The Ninth Circuit recognized as much in
Williams v. Babbitt.150 The case involved an agency’s interpretive rule on
the federal Reindeer Act of 1937. The interpretive rule would have effected
a virtual monopoly on reindeer purchases and sales for Indians, and
prohibited any non-Indian entry into the reindeer industry. The court
ultimately struck down the agency interpretation as an unreasonably broad

147
148
149
150

Id. at 422–23.
Malabed, 335 F.3d at 874 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 868 n.5.
Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997).
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reading of the Reindeer Act. Along the way, the court surveyed Mancari and
its progeny, and stated that “[w]hile Mancari is not necessarily limited to
statutes that give special treatment to Indians on Indian land, we do read
it as shielding only those statutes that affect uniquely Indian interests.” 151
The court continued:
For example, we seriously doubt that Congress could give
Indians a complete monopoly on the casino industry or on
Space Shuttle contracts. At oral argument, counsel for the
government conceded that granting natives a monopoly on
all Space Shuttle contracts would not pass Mancari's
rational-relation test. Counsel could only distinguish the
Space Shuttle preference from a reindeer preference by
noting that, in 1937, natives were heavily involved in the
reindeer business whereas they aren't involved in the
Space Program. The casino example defies this distinction,
but is equally unrelated to "Congress' unique obligation
toward the Indians."152
By this reasoning, the court suggested that the agency’s interpretation
would subject the Reindeer Act to strict scrutiny as a racial classification,
and indicated that it would be struck down as unconstitutional.153 The
analysis in this case seems to be consistent with both the holding and
reasoning behind the Mancari decision. But, as set forth above, other courts
have used Mancari more broadly, treating it as a rubber stamp to insulate
a variety of laws, rules, and programs that rely on Indian status
classifications—often to extend preferential treatment to individual Indians
over members of other racial groups.154
The general takeaway here, as in the above section, is inconsistent
reasoning and results. Once outside the realm of federal legislation touching
on core tribal interests, courts have found freedom to treat Indian status as
a racial classification subject to strict scrutiny, or treat it as a political
classification (that is, apply Morton v. Mancari) subject only to rationalbasis review, to reach a desired outcome or uphold a preferred policy. There

151
152
153
154

Id. at 665.
Id.
Id. at 665–66.
See, e.g., supra notes. 119-122, 127-131, and accompanying text.
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is not a consistent underlying logic beyond this. Treating, for example,
preferences and special programs for individual Indians—members of a U.S.
Census Bureau-designated race—as a political classification, but then
treating a state’s funding to the Navajo Nation—one of the tribal entities
that justifies the racial/political distinction—as a decision impermissibly
made based on racial categorization in Navajo Nation v. New Mexico, can
only be rectified by looking to preferences for certain policies and
outcomes.155
C. “Indian” Status in ICWA
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is deserving of individual
treatment in this section, as it represents a situation where Indian status
is more appropriately cast as a political classification.
ICWA is a remedial statute that “establish[es] minimum Federal
standards for the removal of Indian children from their families.”156 ICWA
uses the Indian status of a child involved in custody, adoption, and removal
proceedings as a trigger for its provisions. It was enacted to combat the
“wholesale removal of Indian children from their homes,” after Congress
found that “an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families [were being]
broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them
by nontribal public and private agencies.”157 Among other provisions, ICWA
dictates a preference for placement of an Indian child with a family member,
a member of the child’s tribe, or other Indian families.158
Indian status under ICWA is appropriately viewed as a political
classification, because the Indian status classification is a means by which
the interests of Indian tribes and the larger Indian community are
represented. ICWA serves Indian tribes—political entities. Leading up to
the creation of ICWA, Congress had found “that there is no resource that is
more vital to the continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than
their children.”159 This is evidenced in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.160 In tracing the purposes
and background of ICWA, the Court quoted Congressional hearing
testimony that emphasized the tribal interests at stake:

See Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir. 1979); Navajo Nation v. New Mexico, 975
F.2d 741, 743 (10th Cir. 1992).
156 25 U.S.C. § 1902.
157 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4) (2012).
158 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 643 (2013).
159 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3).
160 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
155
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Culturally, the chances of Indian survival are significantly
reduced if our children, the only real means for the
transmission of the tribal heritage, are to be raised in nonIndian homes and denied exposure to the ways of their
People. Furthermore, these practices seriously undercut
the tribes’ ability to continue as self-governing
communities. Probably in no area is it more important that
tribal sovereignty be respected than in an area as socially
and culturally determinative as family relationships.161
The Act was recognized as not only “protecting the rights of the
Indian child as an Indian,” but also the “rights of the Indian community and
tribe in retaining its children in its society.”162 The case that called for
application of ICWA in Holyfield involved twin children born to an Indian
mother and father, two-hundred miles from the parents’ tribe’s Mississippi
Choctaw Reservation on which the parents resided. The mother of the
children intentionally gave birth to the children off of the reservation,
voluntarily surrendered custody of the children, and, along with the father,
gave written, advanced consent to adoption of the children by the
prearranged, non-Indian adoptive mother, Vivian Holyfield.163 The adoption
proceedings were conducted in state court. When the tribe tried to intervene
in the adoption, both birth parents affirmed their desire that Holyfield
adopt their children.164 All of this was done in an apparent attempt to place
the children with Holyfield, and escape the application of ICWA.165
Nonetheless, the Court’s majority held that the Mississippi Choctaw tribe
had exclusive jurisdiction over the children’s adoption.166 The Court
explained that:
Tribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant to be
defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe,
for Congress was concerned not solely about the interests
of Indian children and families, but also about the impact
on the tribes themselves of the large numbers of Indian

Id. at 34 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 37 (internal citations omitted).
163 Id. at 37-38.
164 Id. at 54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165 Id., at 39-40 (Brennan, J., majority opinion).
166 Id., at 53-54.
161
162
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children adopted by non-Indians. . . . The numerous
prerogatives accorded the tribes through the ICWA's
substantive provisions . . . must, accordingly, be seen as a
means of protecting not only the interests of individual
Indian children and families, but also of the tribes
themselves. . . . Permitting individual members of the tribe
to avoid tribal exclusive jurisdiction by the simple
expedient of giving birth off the reservation would, to a
large extent, nullify the purpose the ICWA was intended to
accomplish.167
Thus, Holyfield stands for the idea that ICWA affords Indian tribes,
themselves, a set of vested rights that are unique and tailored to their
interests, and separate from the rights and interests of individual, tribalmember Indians. ICWA’s use of Indian status is what gives Indian tribes
the opportunity to exercise their unique rights, and pursue interests of the
Indian tribe and Indian community as a whole, not just the interests of
individuals with Indian blood who happen to be members of an Indian tribe.
Viewing Indian status as a political classification under ICWA is also
appropriate because of the act’s definition of “Indian” and “Indian child.”
Some legislation leaves terms like “Indian” undefined, or otherwise offer no
substantive guidance in determining Indian status. Determination of
Indian status under the Major Crimes Act and General Crimes Act is not
guided by a clear definition, and decisions on Indian status under these acts
are made by non-exhaustive, multi-factor balancing tests that are
formulated and applied in different manners by different courts and in
different cases.168 Under ICWA, an “Indian” is “any person who is a member
of an Indian tribe or who is an Alaska Native and a member of a Regional
Corporation,” and an “Indian child” is a “person who is under age eighteen
and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership
in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe.”169 These definitions make specific reference to the political prong of
Indian status—tribal membership. Under ICWA, only tribal members, or
enrollment-eligible children of tribal members, qualify for Indian status.
Given the clear expression of an Indian tribe’s—not just an Indian
individual’s—interests represented in ICWA, along with definitions that
hinge on tribal affiliation and not just Indian blood, challenges to ICWA

Id. at 49, 52.
See supra text accompanying notes 34–79.
169 25 U.S.C. § 1903(3)–(4) (2012).
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appear to be prime candidates for application of Morton v. Mancari. In
comparison to other cases that have followed Mancari, Indian status in
ICWA presents more clearly as a political, rather than racial, classification,
as the distinction has been made and understood by courts. This may come
up in the next few years, as a number of criticisms have recently been
directed at ICWA.170 In fact, a handful of cases—including a class action
funded, directed, and highly publicized by the Goldwater Institute—have
challenged ICWA on grounds of Equal Protection and racial discrimination.
However, they have largely been dismissed for lack of standing.171 Although
ICWA has not been conclusively tested on the merits in this new round of
challenges, it appears that ICWA exemplifies characteristics that justify
treating its use of Indian status as a political classification, rather than a
racial one. These characteristics can be applied to inform future
congressional acts making use of Indian status—such as clear definitions
that reference tribal membership or affiliation; congressional testimony,
reports, and purpose statements that highlight the representative interests
of Indian tribes and the general Indian community; and an active role for
tribal governments in representing their own interests and furthering the
statutory scheme.
III. T H E
S E NS I B I L I T Y
OF
C UR R EN T
I N D IA N -S T AT US
D E T E R M I N A T IO NS A N D A L T E R NAT I VE A P P R OA CH ES
A. Merits of the Current Scheme
Marilyn Vann framed her position in the Cherokee Freedmen debate
as the question of whether the Cherokee Nation is “a race or a nation?”172
This presentation of the question as a true dichotomy may have been a
heartfelt contention on the part of Vann and the Freedmen. Perhaps it is
more appropriate under the unique circumstances of the Freedmen debate,
given that it involves an internal racial classification, to be made within a
single Indian tribe. However, if taken as a question of the treatment of
Indian status as a whole, it represents a gross oversimplification of the

See also George Will, The Indian Child Welfare Act Puts Identity Politics Above Children’s Safety,
NATIONAL REVIEW, Sept. 3, 2015, http://www.nationalreview.com/article/423460/indian-child-welfareact-puts-identity-politics-above-childrens-safety-george-will; Clint Bolick, The Wrongs We Are Doing
Native American Children, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 2, 2015, http://www.newsweek.com/wrongs-we-aredoing-native-american-children-389771.
171 See Nat’l Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, 733 (E.D. Va. 2015); A.D. v.
Washburn, No. CV-15-01259-PHX-NVW, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38060, at *3 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16,
2017), vacated, No. 17-155839, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 21721 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018).
172 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
170
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history and policy of U.S.-Indian relations, and the flexibility needed in legal
treatment of said history and policy.
The two-prong categorization of Indian status serves both
convenience and necessity. It allows the government to regulate, burden, or
extend benefits and preferences to Indians and Indian tribes, where it would
not be appropriate to do so with other groups of citizens. When a desirable
program is challenged, courts can uphold Indian status as a political
classification. If actions are taken to the detriment of Indians or Indian
tribes, courts can engage in mental gymnastics, or ignore prior case law
altogether, in reaching a decision that nonetheless reflects reality—that is,
that Indian status is inherently racial, even if tied to smoldering embers of
a former sovereignty.173 Courts and legislatures alike are able to
conveniently define Indian status in racial terms, while simultaneously
asserting that their actions are consistent with equal protection principles
because Indian status is political, rather than racial. What this means,
however, is that Indian status is a non-uniform, contextual, and shifting
classification; from case to case, its application may turn on questionable
factual distinctions and conclusions. And it is far from guaranteed that an
individual judge will hold a positive view of tribal sovereignty and interests.
For the time being, the seemingly incoherent legal treatment of
Indian status is coherent in what it accomplishes—namely: convenience,
flexibility, and necessity in reaching desired outcomes or upholding policy
preferences. Flexibility and convenience, however, do not provide long-term
security. By affording courts and Congress the ability to mold conceptions
of Indian status based on policy preferences and convenience, tribes and
individual Indians are subject to potential shifts or inconsistencies in the
preferences of individual judges and subsequent legislatures.

B. An Alternative Approach: Emphasizing the Federal
Relationship to the Sovereign Tribes that Justified the
Political Classification in Mancari

On the wavering and diminished nature of tribal sovereignty possessed by the “domestic, dependent
[Indian] nations,” see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“The sovereignty that the
Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress
and is subject to complete defeasance . . . by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary result
of their dependent status.”) superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1303 (1983 & Supp. 1998), as
recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).

173
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An alternative approach would be to rely more heavily on the status
of tribes as sovereign political entities and less on racial conceptions of
Indian status. Accordingly, criminal jurisdiction would hinge solely on
official recognition of the defendant as an Indian by the tribe, and civil
legislation would have to be related to tribal interests and directed at tribal
members to enjoy insulation from review, under Mancari. This would better
respect the Supreme Court’s landmark yet illusory holding in Williams v.
Lee, recognizing “the right of the Indians to govern themselves” as sovereign
nations.174 Of course, skeptics may note that tribes could gain significant
non-Indian membership and place a strain on the federal government in
requiring more federal funding and federal attention. Opponents might
otherwise conjure up ideas by which tribes game a newfound discretion to
determine membership, free of worries about continuing political vitality
and average blood-quantum. These claims, however, are likely rebuked by
reality. Although some tribes require only a showing of lineal descent from
an original tribal member for enrollment, a number of other tribes restrict
the enrollment of those with lineal descent from original tribal members
and some degree of Indian blood by imposing ranging levels of minimum
blood quantum requirements.175 Many tribal governments now operate just
as much (or more) as business conglomerates, as they do sovereign rulers.176
The recent trend has been for tribes to move beyond already lucrative
gaming and mineral enterprises and into manufacturing plants, commercial
real estate leasing, pharmaceutical companies, and factories.177 Tribes

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959); see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72
n.32 (1978) (“A tribe's right to define its own membership for tribal purposes has long been
recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community.”).
175 Compare Membership/CDIB, THE OSAGE NATION, https://www.osagenation-nsn.gov/what-wedo/cdib-membership (“The Osage Nation Membership Department issues membership cards for
individuals showing lineal descent from an Osage listed on the base roll created pursuant to the
Osage Allotment Act of 1906.”) (last visited Sept. 6, 2018), with Enrollment, THE MISSISSIPPI BOARD
OF CHOCTAW INDIANS, http://www.choctaw.org/government/tribalServices/members/enrollment.html
(explaining that the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians requires that a prospective enrollee have
one-half or more Choctaw blood quantum, and be born to an enrolled member of the tribe) (last
visited Sept. 6, 2018). Tribes employing a minimum-blood quantum typically range from one-half to
one-sixteenth blood requirements.
176 See Joseph P. Kalt & Joseph William Singer, Myths and Realities of Tribal Sovereignty: The Law
and Economics of Indian Self-Rule 1–2 (Harvard University. Faculty Research, Working Paper No.,
RWP04-016, 2004); David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, Robert A Williams, Jr., Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law 24 (6th ed., 2011).
177 See id.
174
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likely have an interest in limiting their membership, to limit the dispersion
of the funds generated from casinos, oil and gas leases, lumber and mineral
resources, and tribal enterprises. This tribal interest likely coincides with
federal interests in limiting the amount of federal funds expended as part
of the unique federal government relationship with Indian tribes, and the
Indians within them. Indeed, the more recent concern has been tribal
disenrollment of members—with some cases bringing allegations of
economic and financial motives behind the disenrollment.178
In the criminal context for individual defendants, this would mean
getting rid of the Rogers racial/political prongs and relying more simply on
tribal enrollment or other official recognition (which usually itself requires
some quantum of racial "Indian blood"). For the Supreme Court’s decision
in United States v. Antelope to mean what it says, the only proper inquiry is
whether a criminal defendant is officially affiliated with a tribe.179
In the civil context, federal legislation, in order to be subject to
rational basis review as a political classification under Mancari, would have
to bear relation to Congress' authority to deal with tribes, and tribal
members, under the Indian Commerce Clause and federal trust
relationship. This would preserve legislation that regulates tribal economic
development/enterprises,180 serves tribal continuity and vitality,181 or
promotes self-government.182
Federal legislation that extends differential treatment to Native
Americans more generally and lacks a strong tie to tribal interests would be
subject to heightened scrutiny. This was the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s

See, e.g., Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal Disenrollment Epidemic:
In Search of a Remedy, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 383, 409 (2015).
179 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977) (holding that the defendants “were not subjected to federal criminal
jurisdiction because they are of the Indian race but because they are enrolled members of the Coeur
d’Alene tribe.”).
180 California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216–217 (1987) (recognizing that
encouraging tribal economic development is an “important federal interest” and promotes larger
goals of tribal self-government and independence), superseded by statute, 25 U.S.C. § 2701, as
recognized in Michigan v. Bay Hills Indian Cmty., No.12-515 (May 27, 2014).
181 See supra text accompanying notes 137–149 (explaining that ICWA is such an act, ensuring that
tribes can maintain their population base and cultural life).
182 In Mancari, the Supreme Court found that the BIA employment preference furthered selfgovernment, given the role of the BIA in managing tribes and Indian affairs. See Morton v. Mancari,
417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974). The more clear-cut example of self-government would be legislation that
shifts jurisdiction and regulation from state/federal government, to the tribes themselves.
178

2019]

Legal Treatments of Indian Status

84

decision in Williams v. Babbitt—that Mancari only shields “uniquely Indian
interests.”183 For example, a program that extends benefits to individuals
that identify as Native American but live off-reservation and are not
enrolled in federally-recognized tribes, might draw a heightened standard
of review. The “tribal” or “sovereign” interests in such a situation are
tenuous, as the individuals benefitting from the classification would lack a
non-racial link to tribal governments.
Any independent state legislation that does not descend from a
federal program or federal treaty obligation would be subject to strict
scrutiny, because states do not possess the same plenary authority over
Indian affairs as U.S. Congress.184
This approach would limit the realm in which Congress and states can
legislate. Critics would likely argue that it overlooks the legitimate interest
that government may have in remedying past injustices that operate
against individual Native Americans, as members of a racial group. The
basis for such a claim is founded upon the role of federal government as a
trustee, within the federal-tribal trust relationship. But the Supreme Court
has been increasingly skeptical of the idea that special treatment of a racial
group is consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection principles.185
C. An Alternative Approach: Transparent Balancing that
Reflects the Unique Quasi -Sovereign, Quasi -Racial Aspects
of Indian Status
Criticizing the Supreme Court’s decision in Mancari, the federal
district court in KG Urban Enterprises offered that, if approaching the issue
as one of first impression, it would:
treat Indian tribal status as a quasi-political, quasi-racial
classification subject to varying levels of scrutiny
depending on the authority making it and the interests at

Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 1997) (showing that this perceivably would limit
the ability of government to engage in differential treatment of individuals identifying as Native
American who live outside of tribal reservations and are not enrolled in federally-recognized tribes).
But see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Tribal Sovereign Interests Beyond the Reservation Borders, 12 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 1003, 1041 (2008) (arguing that such treatment would fall within Congress’ power
as a trustee, in the scope of the federal-tribal trust relationship).
184 See Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 70 P.3d 416, 422 (Alaska 2003).
185 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
183
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stake. Federal laws relating to native land, tribal status or
Indian culture would require minimal review because such
laws fall squarely within the historical and constitutional
authority of Congress to regulate core Indian affairs. Laws
granting gratuitous Indian preferences divorced from
those interests . . . would be subject to more searching
scrutiny.186
This aside from the court picked up where the Ninth Circuit left off
in Williams v. Babbitt, holding that only legislation involving “uniquely
Indian interests” is shielded from searching review.187 Perhaps the more
feasible approach, reflecting the broad context in which federal and state
governments interact with tribes and their citizens, is a flexible framework
of multifactor balancing. And the Supreme Court’s adoption of a flexible
level of scrutiny to accommodate unique circumstances would not be a novel
break from its existing caselaw.188
Three factors seem pertinent in this framework. The first, and
heaviest, would be the strength of the tribal interests at stake—whether the
classification involves uniquely Indian interests in self-government,
economic development, or continuity of tribal culture. The second factor
would be whether the classification is aimed at remedying specific
aftereffects of federal mismanagement towards tribes and Indians, or
simply confers a benefit upon those with Native American ancestry. This
gives due heed to the idea that the federal government, in the exercise of its
trust obligation, should have the authority and flexibility to correct the error
in its past policies.189 The third factor, related to the second, involves the

KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 404 (D. Mass. 2012), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part by KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). The First Circuit did not
otherwise raise objections to the district court’s criticism of Mancari.
187 115 F.3d at 665.
188 See Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1043,
1057, 1046–47 (2017) (identifying five de facto tiers of scrutiny employed by the court, such as the
use of “strict scrutiny lite” in upholding explicit racial classifications in the context of higher
education affirmative action).
189 See, e.g., Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. L.J. 1, 64 (1995); Larry A. DiMatteo
& Michael J. Meagher, Broken Promises: The Failure of the 1920’s Native American Irrigation and
Assimilation Policies, 19 HAW. L. REV. 1, 34 (1997) (supporting the idea that the government might
have an interest in special housing and land acquisition programs for urban Indians that recognize
the impact that assimilation and allotment policies had on the individual Indian, separate and apart
from any modern connection to the tribe).
186

2019]

Legal Treatments of Indian Status

86

impact that the legislation has on individuals who belong to other racial
groups—is it a program tailored to Indians and tribal interests, or is it a
classification within a broader program or regulatory scheme that confers a
competitive benefit on Indians, to the detriment of similarly-situated nonIndians? This strikes a compromise between the history and continuing
need for special legislation aimed at tribes and Indians as a unique, quasiracial quasi-political group, while still accounting for the core dictate of
equal protection—that special attention is required when government
engages in differential treatment, particularly on the basis of race.190 As one
court has put it, the “breadth of the Federal power over Indian tribes and
its resulting conflicts with equal protection theory require that the power
be exercised with regard to its effect on non-Indians as well as Indians.”191
This approach may be preferable to that of the preceding subsection,
because it is more sensitive to the idea of government—federal, and perhaps
state, in some contexts—enacting remedial legislation to address
inequalities rooted in historical treatment of tribes and their citizens at the
hands of government. This allows for a broader role of the federal
government in executing its role as a trustee to Indian tribes. But perhaps
the most attractive aspect of this approach is that it would inject judicial
transparency into the legal analysis of classifications based on Indian
status. As the Ninth Circuit did in Williams v. Babbitt, courts would be
required to take an open and honest inventory of the nature of the
classification and the interests at stake.192 This could lead to more
reasonable analysis—and thus allow legislators and tribes more
predictability—than the current regime, which has treated the single
political entity of the Navajo Nation as a racial classification, while treating
individual Indians as the subject of a political classification, without any
clarity of analysis. Perceivably, in these cases, courts have already been
conducting this kind of balancing and weighing of interests—the calculus
has just occurred behind the scenes.

E.g., Kornhass Constr. Inc. v. Okla. Dep’t of Cent. Serv., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1249 (W.D. Okla.
2001). There, the court applied strict scrutiny to a state “bidding preference to American Indians,” as
it was not clearly tied to Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indian tribes” or “furthering tribal
self-government.” Id.
191
State v. Zay Zah, 259 N.W. 2d 580, 591 (Minn. 1977).
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See 115 F.3d at 665.
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C O N C L US I ON
Whether correct or incorrect, consistent or incoherent from a legal
perspective, applying both a racial and political prong to Indian status
makes sense from a realist view. Divorced from the Cherokee Freedmen
debate and applied generally, Chief Smith’s statement that “an Indian
nation should be composed of Indians” seems inherently correct, even if the
specific reasons cannot be fully articulated. The political prong is a nod to
the fact that Indian tribes were once sovereign nations that contracted and
made treaties with the United States (along with the Spanish, British, and
French), in government-to-government relations. Initially by strategic or
tactical choice, this sovereignty was never “extinguished” by, say, a decisive
military conquest. This continuous (but modified and limited) sovereignty,
and the resulting political prong of Indian status, differentiates Indians
from other minority groups who, though subject to historical mistreatment
and perhaps otherwise deserving of remedial legislation, have no such tie to
a continuing sovereign entity—American descendants of Irish immigrants
or Black slaves, for example, are subject to the political sovereignty of the
United States alone, and have been so since the entrance (by force or by
choice) of their ancestors into the borders of the United States. On the other
hand, the continuing political sovereignty of Indian status is founded upon
the existence of the racial prong. The history of each tribe is a history of the
ancestors of its modern members, and without genealogical ties to these
ancestors and their experiences, the basis for a special relationship between
the federal government and Indians is lost. After all, it is not the Lakota
Tribe that was massacred by U.S. soldiers at Wounded Knee, but rather 150
individual Lakota tribal members. Nor was it the Navajo tribe that turned
limited government provisions of flour, salt, and lard into the now-iconic
frybread, but rather individual members of the Diné trying to survive the
forced relocation march, or “Long Walk,” across the deserts of the
Southwest. It is this genealogical and cultural heritage that lives on in
individual Indians, and it is the decision of these individuals to maintain an
“existence . . . as a separate and distinct people,” that fans the flames of
continued tribal sovereignty.193

Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 583 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring), abrogated by Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
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